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Abstract. An important question in the dynamic European wholesale markets for 
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approach by considering for each member state whether there is one single other 
country that provides a substitute for domestic production, the market in each 
separate member state has still to be considered a separate market. However, if we 
allow for the possibility that at different moments in time there is another country 
that provides a substitute for domestic production, then the conclusion should be 
that certain member states do not constitute a separate geographical market. This is 
in particular true for Belgium, but also for The Netherlands, France, and to some 
extent also for Germany and Austria. We call this alternative approach the “and/or” 
approach.  
 
 
Key words: Electricity, convergence, market definition, market coupling 
JEL codes: L94, L40 
 
 
Correspondence: Elbert Dijkgraaf, Erasmus School of Economics and SEOR, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, H 7-25, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands, Tel: 31 
10 4082590, Fax: 31 10 4089650, Email: dijkgraaf@ese.eur.nl 
 2
1. Introduction 
Electricity markets in Europe are undergoing important changes, mainly because of the 
attempt of the European Commission to create one, large European market that is liberalized 
and free of excessive regulation. An important step in the process of creating one European 
market is the construction of much larger interconnection capacities to trade electricity across 
borders of different member states.1 In reaction to these policy developments, the industry is 
in a process of restructuring and relatively many mergers and acquisitions are taken place. 
National competition authorities and regulators are faced with the question how to evaluate 
these activities. A first, important step in these evaluations is to assess the relevant product 
market. At a retail level, it seems by and large clear that the relevant market is not larger than 
the national level. At the wholesale level, however, this is less clear. In this paper we address 
the question how to define wholesale electricity markets in Europe. As explained above, this 
question is relevant to assess how successful the general policy of the European Commission 
is and also for evaluating an actual merger or acquisition proposal. 
 
Relevant markets are typically defined by answering the question whether two individual 
products are substitutes for each other (EU, 1997). If a competition authority concludes that 
no single product acts as a full substitute, then the product under consideration is considered 
to constitute its own relevant market and the HHI (or some alternative measure in the case of 
electricity markets, such as the Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI) or the Residual Supplier Index (RSI)) 
calculated in that market is considered to be a proper indication of whether that market is 
concentrated and a firm’s market share in that market a proper indication of whether a firm 
has a dominant position. Electricity itself is, of course, a homogeneous good so that the 
question concerning the definition of the relevant market is mainly a question concerning the 
definition of the geographical market (and thus implicitly whether import capacity is such that 
electricity produced in neighboring countries can act as a substitute for domestically produced 
electricity in satisfying local demand).  
 
Due to the arbitrage possibilities, electricity prices in the different countries should be 
identical if import capacity is abundant so that there is one geographical market. Even more, 
since November 21, 2006 the power exchanges of the Netherlands, Belgium and France are 
linked and the interconnection capacity is optimally used in the bidding process so that 
                                                 
1 In the past, the production (and distribution) of electricity in each individual European country was in the hands 
of (local) government-owned agencies. The capacity to import and export electricity was also rather limited.  
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arbitrage possibilities between wholesale electricity prices in these three countries are 
automatically exploited if existing. Electricity prices can only be different across different 
neighboring countries if import capacity forms a bottleneck.  
 
Due to the fact that electricity cannot be stored, there is also a time dimension in defining the 
market: the electricity market between 8 and 9 am, for example, is different from the market 
between 9 and 10 pm. Import capacity may be large enough in non-peak hours to be able to 
speak about one non-peak market that is larger than an individual country, but if the 
interconnection capacity is still too small in peak hours to be able to provide domestic users 
an alternative supply, then the conclusion may be that one should stick to a narrowly defined 
market (certainly for peak hours). This is especially the case as large firms may benefit 
greatly from a dominant position during peak hours. The fact that overall the different 
national electricity wholesale prices seem to be close to each other may not be enough reason 
for competition authorities to conclude that there is one (large) relevant market as market 
power (if existing) can imply very high profits in a relatively small time period. 
 
In this paper we want to argue that the approach to defining the relevant geographical market 
by considering for each member state (and each hour) whether there is one single other 
country that provides a substitute for domestic production has important limitations. In 
particular, such an approach does not take into account the high volatility of demand and the 
technical limitations of the transmission network. Due to the non-storability of electric energy the size 
of the relevant market in the electricity sector (and the market by which it is constrained) changes from 
hour-to-hour. We show that if we currently take the traditional approach, the market in each 
separate member state has still to be considered a separate market. However, if we allow for 
the possibility that at a certain hour there is either one country or another country (or both or 
more) that provides a substitute for domestic production, then the conclusion should be that 
certain member states do not constitute a separate geographical market. This is in particular 
true for Belgium, but also for The Netherlands, France, and to some extent for Germany and 
Austria. In fact, one may argue that these countries are close to forming one large wholesale 
electricity market. In contrast, even if we use this “and/or” approach for countries like Italy, 
Spain and the Nordic countries, united in Nordpool,2 the conclusion should be that they 
remain separate geographic markets. 
 
                                                 
2 These countries include Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. 
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It is clear that a firm producing electricity in country A is more constrained in its behavior by 
electricity producers in countries B and/or C than by producers in countries B only or C only. 
How large the “and/or” effect is depends on the size of the different cross border 
interconnection capacities in relation to the size and form (nuclear, gas, coal) of domestic 
electricity demand and supply. We show that in comparison to other countries Belgium has a 
relatively large cross border interconnection capacity implying that the “and/or” effect in 
Belgium should be larger than in neighboring countries. The analysis shows that the effect for 
Belgium is so large that at any point in time, there is always at least one other country (most 
notably France and/or The Netherlands) that forms a competitive constraint on the Belgian 
wholesale market, even though the French and Dutch electricity production by itself cannot be 
considered a full substitute for electricity produced in Belgium as there are hours during the 
day where import capacity forms a bottleneck for an integrated market. This, of course, does 
not mean that we may never expect to observe high prices in the Belgian wholesale market. 
However, when the Belgian wholesale prices are high the corresponding prices in France 
and/or The Netherlands are also high.  
 
The definition of the relevant electricity market has important repercussion for how to 
consider firm conduct or possible (horizontal or vertical) mergers. If an individual country is 
the relevant product market, a firm that is mainly operating in the wholesale market of that 
country is much more likely to have a dominant position it could potentially exploit. On the 
other hand, if the geographical market is wider, the behavior of that company is constrained 
by foreign electricity producers. 
 
As far as we know, this is the first article analyzing the issue of market definition by taking 
the possibility of a competitive constraint imposed by multiple alternative products (countries) 
into account. This “and/or” approach we argue fits well the “flighty” nature of electricity 
markets. There exists, of course, some literature taking a more traditional approach toward 
market definition analyzing the process of price convergence in wholesale European 
electricity markets.3 For instance, using hourly data up to 2004 Zachmann (2005) finds clear 
convergence between Germany and the Netherlands for 12 out of 24 hours. However, there 
was no full convergence at the end of this period, since significant price differentials for peak 
                                                 
3 Many papers analyze the price level itself as electricity has some characteristics that result in a different pricing 
behavior compared with other products (e.g. Knittel and Roberts, 2005 and Mount et al. 2006). As long as 
electricity producers belong to the same market this literature does not interfere with our study. However, it 
might explain why prices in countries differ at some points of time. 
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hours were still present. Armstrong and Galli (2005) find that also for peak hours the 
differential decreased between 2002 and 2004. They used hourly data for Germany, France, 
the Netherlands and Spain. Bosco et al (2006) find strong, but not perfect, integration of the 
German, French, Austrian and Dutch market using weekly median data for the period March 
2002 till June 2006. Dijkgraaf and Janssen (2007) explore price convergence further as new 
hourly data are available for 2007. Their paper shows that the process of price convergence 
has continued since 2005 also for peak hours and that it is likely that in some years from now 
there will be a fully integrated European wholesale electricity market. Robinson (2007) uses 
yearly data as this makes it possible to study convergence from a longer historical perspective. 
He concludes that a process towards convergence is present using yearly data for nine EU-
countries from 1978 till 2003. Pelagatti et al. (2007) uses weekly media data for the period 
January 1999 till March 2007. They compare electricity prices for Austria, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain and the Nordic countries. They analyze whether countries share a 
common trend and do find this for Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Zachman 
(2008) uses hourly data for Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK) from 2002 to mid 2006. He tests whether 
pairs of countries show convergence and concludes that this is increasingly the case, but that 
for a significant share of observations no full convergence is present. Perrot-Voisard and 
Zachmann (2009), also take the flighty nature of electricity markets as a starting-point. They 
propose an alternative concentration measure that takes into account how often prices in two 
countries differ more than 5% from each other.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the methodology 
employed, the data used and some descriptive statistics. Section 3 gives the results and 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology, data and descriptive statistics 
As explained in the introduction, electricity prices vary by the hour as electricity is a non-
storable product. Daily per hour wholesale prices for the one-day-ahead market in Belgium, 
France, Germany, The Netherlands, the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark), Poland and Spain over the period of 22 November 2006 until 21 December 2008 
(two years, 731 observations for each hour in all countries) are publicly available.45 The 
                                                 
4 See www.apx.nl, www.eex.com, www.belpex.be, www.powernext.fr, www.nordpool.com. www.polpx.pl, 
www.omel.es, www.mercatoelelettrico.org.   
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starting date is chosen to be one day after 21 November 2006 as this is the date that the 
Belgian power exchange started and the power exchanges of the Netherlands, Belgium and 
France were coupled. These prices are taken from the respective national electricity power 
exchanges BELPEX, PWXT, EEX, APX, EXAA, IPEX, NordPool, POLPX and Omel. To get 
some idea about these data, Figure 1 gives a picture of how average electricity prices per hour 
over the observation period vary over the 24 hours of a day.6 Figures 2a and 2b provide two 
time series of how hourly electricity prices have varied over the time horizon.  
 
Figure 1. Average price in €/MWh per hour 
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These descriptive statistics make two things very clear. First, from Figure 1 it is clear that in 
most countries there is a difference between peak hours and non-peak hours, with peak hours 
being defined as the 9th till the 20th hour.7 Prices in peak hours are around €50/MWh and 
higher. Prices in non-peak hours are typically around €45/MWh and lower. The only marked 
exception to this pattern are the Nordic countries where average prices are roughly stable over 
the day, possibly because of the relatively extensive use of water power. Prices in the peak 
period itself have two marked peaks, around noon and around the 19th hour. This difference 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 Observations are excluded if prices are less than 0.05 euro per MWh as this indicates that at that hour there was 
(nearly) no demand for electricity. Data are also excluded for Belgium for two days due to exceptional 
circumstances (availability problems): 26/1/2008 (hours 1-6 and 22-24) and 3/5/2008. 
6 See Appendix A for the most important descriptive statistics. 
7 Of course, one can argue where the exact boundary between peak and non-peak hours is. This is not to deny, 
however, that there is a marked difference between the two periods. 
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plays also some role in the details of the interpretation of our results in the next Section. 
Moreover, we can already see from Figure 1 that the electricity prices in Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany and The Netherlands are somewhat grouped together and distinct from the 
lower prices in the Nordic countries, Spain and Poland and the markedly higher prices in 
Italy. Second, in Figures 2a and 2b, we have depicted a typical time series of one peak and 
one non-peak hour as a function of time. From the Figures it is clear that there is much more 
variation in the peak hour series than in the non-peak hour series.8 Moreover, the two pictures 
convey the idea that the time series we are dealing with are stationary. If we want to be 
justified in simply regressing hourly wholesale electricity prices in one country on 
(composite) hourly wholesale electricity prices of (a set of) other countries using OLS, then 
we should exclude the possibility of the time series being non-stationary.  
 
Figure 2a. Price hour 6 in €/MWh at BELPEX per day 
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We formally test for stationarity using ttt yy   1 , where ty  is the price of wholesale 
electricity in a certain country and a certain hour at day t and γ and φ are parameters to be 
estimated, and show, using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (see, e.g., Greene, 2000), that we 
can reject the hypothesis that there is a unit root nearly in all cases.9 Accordingly, we 
                                                 
8 To make the figures comparable, the horizontal axis has a maximal value of 200 euro per MW. For the 18th 
hour some days show a higher price than this maximum. Note that price spikes are a regular phenomenon in 
electricity markets (Huisman and Mahieu, 2003). 
9 Only for Nordpool (hour 1 50 5 and 20 to 24) and POLPX (hours 2 and 3) we cannot reject the unit root 
hypothesis. We therefore also analyze whether our conclusions are robust for estimations in first differences. 
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subsequently perform the standard approach in the literature (e.g. Armstrong and Galli, 2005 
and Zachman, 2005) and do a simple regression analysis of the form  
   ji thjth PP ,,          (1) 
where jthP ,  are the price of wholesale electricity in country j at a certain hour h at day t and α 
and β are parameters to be estimated.10 If the two countries have one fully integrated market, 
one should expect in equation (1) to find that α=0 and β=1. Apart from the coefficients, the R2 
is also a very relevant indicator of how tight electricity prices in two countries are connected 
to each other. Even if the coefficients are close to what is expected it may be that the R2 is still 
not very high, indicating that there are days in which the prices in the two countries show a 
significant difference. Only when α=0, β=1 and the R2 is close to 1, can we speak of an 
integrated market where the price in one country imposes a competitive constraint on the 
price of another country at (almost) every moment. 
 
Figure 2b. Price hour 18 in €/MWh at BELPEX per day 
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To test the idea that a competitive constraint is imposed by a combination of countries, but not 
by one country on its own, we perform a similar analysis but we replace the price of one other 
country as “explanatory” variable, by a composite variable (MIX), where for each day we 
take that observation from the set of observations for all other countries that is closest to the 
price observation of the country that needs to be explained. In the analysis presented here we 
have not restricted the composite variable to the neighboring countries of the country under 
                                                 
10 Including a trend in the estimations does not change our conclusions. 
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consideration. This is because, in principle, one could buy electricity in the wholesale market 
in any other country and buy the necessary interconnection capacity at an auction. This is, of 
course, more complicated for countries that are relatively far apart from each other, but not 
impossible both in theory and in practice.11 This is particularly so for France and the 
Netherlands where the market connection that has been established in November 2006 makes 
importing and exporting between these two countries a lot easier. 
 
Table 1a. Observations (%) with less than 1% price difference: all hours 
 APX BELPEX EEX EXAA IPEX NordPool OMEL POLPX PWXT 
APX - 78 6 9 2 1 4 2 67 
BELPEX 78 - 6 8 2 1 4 2 87 
EEX 6 6 - 7 1 2 3 2 6 
EXAA 9 8 7 - 1 2 2 2 8 
IPEX 2 2 1 1 - 0 1 1 2 
NordPool 1 1 2 2 0 - 1 1 1 
OMEL 4 4 3 2 1 1 - 3 4 
POLPX 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 - 2 
PWXT 67 87 6 8 2 1 4 2 - 
MIX 82 98 21 23 6 8 11 11 90 
 
Table 1b. Observations (%) with less than 10% price difference: all hours 
 APX BELPEX EEX EXAA IPEX NordPool OMEL POLPX PWXT 
APX - 85 49 60 17 14 28 21 78 
BELPEX 85 - 46 54 18 14 28 20 91 
EEX 50 47 - 55 13 16 24 24 48 
EXAA 61 55 55 - 14 16 24 24 54 
IPEX 16 17 13 14 - 4 12 6 17 
NordPool 14 14 17 16 4 - 14 17 14 
OMEL 28 28 24 24 12 14 - 28 29 
POLPX 22 21 24 24 6 16 25 - 21 
PWXT 78 91 47 54 17 14 29 20 - 
MIX 97 99 84 88 36 45 59 64 98 
 
Of course, one already can get some idea whether prices are significantly similar to each other 
by simply looking what percentage of the day’s electricity prices in two countries differ less 
than 1% or 10% from each other or from the composite prices. These descriptive statistics for 
                                                 
11 As a robustness check, we have performed a similar analysis, but restricting the composite variable to the 
neighboring countries. This is of course, somewhat problematic also becauise we do not have data for 
neighboring countries that are not in the data set (this is of particular importance for Poland and Austria). The 
results of this analysis qualitatively support the conclusions we report here. Details can be obtained from the 
authors (or can be checked independently as all data sources are publicly available). 
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all countries are presented in Table 1a for a 1% difference and in Table 1b for a 10% 
difference. 
Table 1a clearly shows that Belgian wholesale electricity prices differ almost always less than 
1% from either the Dutch or the French electricity prices. Comparing the Belgian wholesale 
electricity prices with the composite price of Dutch, French and German prices (MIX) shows 
that the fit is almost perfect, in 98% of the observations is the difference less than 1%. This is 
not nearly so perfect the case for other countries, although also for the Dutch (APX) and 
French (PWXT) markets the percentage is quite high. When one takes the allowable 
difference to be 10% also the EEX (Germany), EXAA (Austria) show a good fit with the MIX 
data. The potential power of the “and/or” approach can especially be seen when considering 
the table 1b for EEX and EXAA. There is no individual country that has on more than 55% 
(60%) of the observations a difference of less than 10% with the prices quoted at the 
respective power exchange, however when one makes a composite index to compare the data 
with, there is a close resemblance in 84 (88)% of the observations.  
 
Table 2a. Interconnection capacity between two countries in the data set 
  Country of export 
  APX BELPEX EEX EXAA IPEX NordPool Omel POLPX PWXT Other 
APX 0 1,796 2,904 - - 0 - - - 0 
BELPEX 1,147 0 0 - - - - - 2,250 0 
EEX 2,353 0 0 1,400 - 2,210 - 1,100 2,550 5,625 
EXAA - - 1,600 0 257 - - - - 2,300 
IPEX - - - 220 0 - - - 2,650 3,680 
NordPool 0 - 1,720 - - 0 - 550 - 1,400 
Omel - - - - - - 0 - 1,400 1,700 
POLPX - - 2,000 - - 550 - 0 - 950 
C
ou
nt
ry
 o
f i
m
po
rt 
PWXT - 2,750 2,500 - 4,099 - 600 - 0 0 
Source: CESI (2005) 
 
One explanation for this almost perfect fit between the Belgian electricity prices and the 
composite price of electricity prices is that the interconnection capacity, expressed as a 
percentage of the total nationwide available production capacity is indeed the highest in 
Belgium as described in Table 2b.12 The same is true, but to a lesser extent, for The 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and France. Table 2a gives the basic information about 
interconnection capacity between two countries. One can also see from both tables that for 
                                                 
12 One should be careful, however, with such a conclusion as interconnection capacity may be congested. 
Pelagatti et al. (2007, p. 6 ) write that this is frequently the case for Germany. 
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Poland (the country with the largest import capacity as a percentage of domestic production 
after these countries) most of the capacity comes from Germany and as German wholesale 
electricity prices are typically higher than the Polish prices, Germany does not impose much 
of a competitive constraint on Poland. 
 
Table 2b. Import capacity (as a percentage of installed production)  
             Total import capacity (MW) Share import capacity (% of capacity) 
  
Installed 
capacity (MW)   
 
Excluding  
countries outside 
the data set 
Including 
countries outside 
the data set Country level 
Excluding 
countries outside 
the data set 
Including 
countries outside 
the data set 
APX 4,700 4,700 20,926 22 22 
BELPEX 3,397 3,397 14,305 24 24 
EEX 9,613 15,238 120,859 8 13 
EXAA 1,857 4,157 14,664 13 28 
IPEX 2,870 6,550 71,171 4 9 
NordPool 2,270 3,670 74,075 3 5 
Omel 1,400 3,100 66,388 2 5 
POLPX 2,550 3,500 30,019 8 12 
PWXT 9,949 9,949 103,900 10 10 
Source: CESI (2005) 
 
 
3. Results 
In this section we provide four sets of results. The first set of results concerns the preliminary 
test on the stationarity of the time series involved. As for most of the time series we can 
clearly reject the hypothesis that the time series are non-stationary, we subsequently simply 
perform OLS analyses of the relation (expressed in equation (1)) between wholesale 
electricity prices at individual power exchanges and corresponding prices in neighboring 
countries and then also between prices at individual power exchanges and corresponding 
composite prices. In these analyses, we take Belgium as a showcase as the results for that 
country in general, and the impact of our new approach in particular, are the starkest. The 
focus on one individual country also serves a didactical purpose of showing the details of the 
analysis. We also show the corresponding results for all countries in general overview tables. 
Finally, we do a robustness check by presenting the results of the analysis in first differences. 
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3.1 Testing for non-stationarity (unit roots) 
As described in the former section we test for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test. Table 3 presents the result for the hypothesis of a unit root in the electricity prices. This 
hypothesis is rejected for nearly all 24 hours. Only for NordPool (hour 1 to 5 and 20 to 24) 
and POLPX (hour 2 and 3) the test rejects a unit root. As already said, at the end of this 
Section we also analyze whether our conclusions are robust for estimations in first differences 
as a sensitivity analyses. 
 
3.2 Individual country comparisons  
We next present the results of the analysis where a country‘s wholesale price is explained in 
terms of the prices in one other country. We first focus on Belgian wholesale electricity prices 
and ask how these prices compare with similar prices in surrounding countries. In table 4 we 
present, we focus on the relation with France (as this is the strongest link) and in table 5 we 
also present the global results for all individual country comparisons. For every hour of the 
data, the analysis is based on estimating the coefficients of equation (1). Table 4 presents the 
estimation results for estimating equation (1) for every hour separately with French PWXT 
prices as explanatory variables and Belgian prices as the variable to be explained and we use a 
Wald-test to test the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to 0 and 1, respectively.  
 
It becomes clear from reading the table that in almost all peak hours (except for hours 15, 16, 
17 and 20) we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are indeed equal to 0 and 1 (what 
needs to be the case when markets are fully integrated). Although the coefficient for PWXT is 
always close to 1, the constant is often positive and significant implying a higher price level in 
Belgium compared to France. However, even when the hypothesis is not rejected the R2 is not 
very close to 1 indicating that there is no perfect match between the prices in the two 
countries.  
 
Moreover, we have also estimated the average price difference and it turns out that this 
average price difference can be larger in peak hours where the test result is positive than in 
non-peak hours where the test result shows that the two series are not identical. Economic 
significance (in terms of whether or not firms can gain significant profits because of price 
margins) is thus not identical to statistical significance. For instance, Table 4 shows that the 
average price difference in hour 1 is € 0.18 per MWh and a statistical test result indicating 
that the two series are not identical, whereas the  average price difference in hour 17 is  € 2.83 
Table 3. Unit root tests 
 APX BELPEX EEX EXAA IPEX NordPool Omel POLPX PWXT 
Hour Test Prob Test Prob Test Prob Test Prob Test Prob Test Prob Test Prob Test Prob Test Prob 
1 -6.0 0.00 -5.2 0.00 -6.3 0.00 -5.0 0.00 -6.8 0.00 -1.7 0.44 -5.4 0.00 -3.8 0.00 -5.5 0.00 
2 -5.7 0.00 -5.9 0.00 -7.3 0.00 -6.1 0.00 -7.6 0.00 -2.0 0.30 -4.8 0.00 -2.3 0.17 -6.1 0.00 
3 -6.1 0.00 -6.2 0.00 -7.6 0.00 -6.9 0.00 -8.2 0.00 -2.3 0.18 -4.6 0.00 -2.5 0.11 -6.7 0.00 
4 -7.0 0.00 -7.3 0.00 -8.0 0.00 -7.0 0.00 -9.2 0.00 -2.5 0.11 -4.4 0.00 -3.5 0.01 -7.4 0.00 
5 -7.1 0.00 -7.2 0.00 -7.1 0.00 -7.3 0.00 -8.8 0.00 -2.7 0.07 -4.3 0.00 -4.0 0.00 -7.5 0.00 
6 -8.5 0.00 -8.0 0.00 -8.8 0.00 -9.1 0.00 -8.4 0.00 -3.4 0.01 -3.4 0.01 -5.2 0.00 -8.1 0.00 
7 -10.3 0.00 -9.8 0.00 -9.9 0.00 -11.1 0.00 -10.4 0.00 -4.8 0.00 -3.2 0.02 -4.9 0.00 -9.5 0.00 
8 -11.1 0.00 -10.9 0.00 -11.9 0.00 -12.0 0.00 -11.4 0.00 -6.0 0.00 -5.7 0.00 -5.2 0.00 -10.4 0.00 
9 -11.2 0.00 -10.8 0.00 -11.6 0.00 -11.2 0.00 -12.9 0.00 -6.2 0.00 -7.5 0.00 -5.3 0.00 -10.2 0.00 
10 -11.6 0.00 -11.7 0.00 -10.3 0.00 -10.4 0.00 -16.3 0.00 -5.2 0.00 -6.7 0.00 -5.0 0.00 -10.6 0.00 
11 -13.2 0.00 -12.9 0.00 -10.0 0.00 -10.1 0.00 -15.0 0.00 -4.5 0.00 -5.8 0.00 -4.6 0.00 -10.6 0.00 
12 -13.4 0.00 -12.6 0.00 -11.1 0.00 -10.7 0.00 -13.7 0.00 -4.0 0.00 -5.5 0.00 -4.5 0.00 -9.7 0.00 
13 -10.2 0.00 -9.4 0.00 -9.2 0.00 -9.7 0.00 -9.2 0.00 -3.9 0.00 -5.4 0.00 -4.5 0.00 -8.4 0.00 
14 -11.9 0.00 -10.8 0.00 -10.4 0.00 -10.2 0.00 -10.3 0.00 -4.1 0.00 -4.9 0.00 -4.6 0.00 -8.6 0.00 
15 -13.7 0.00 -13.0 0.00 -10.7 0.00 -10.6 0.00 -12.6 0.00 -4.2 0.00 -4.4 0.00 -5.3 0.00 -8.9 0.00 
16 -14.1 0.00 -13.5 0.00 -10.4 0.00 -10.6 0.00 -14.6 0.00 -3.8 0.00 -5.3 0.00 -5.9 0.00 -9.5 0.00 
17 -14.3 0.00 -14.2 0.00 -9.8 0.00 -10.6 0.00 -14.8 0.00 -3.6 0.01 -5.9 0.00 -8.4 0.00 -10.9 0.00 
18 -15.4 0.00 -15.3 0.00 -10.5 0.00 -10.8 0.00 -10.7 0.00 -4.0 0.00 -6.2 0.00 -11.2 0.00 -11.5 0.00 
19 -9.8 0.00 -13.6 0.00 -10.1 0.00 -10.5 0.00 -8.0 0.00 -3.3 0.01 -5.0 0.00 -11.6 0.00 -13.6 0.00 
20 -6.8 0.00 -11.5 0.00 -7.2 0.00 -7.6 0.00 -6.8 0.00 -2.7 0.07 -3.7 0.00 -9.2 0.00 -11.4 0.00 
21 -5.0 0.00 -16.7 0.00 -6.4 0.00 -6.1 0.00 -7.8 0.00 -2.6 0.09 -3.3 0.02 -8.1 0.00 -16.7 0.00 
22 -4.1 0.00 -6.1 0.00 -5.3 0.00 -4.9 0.00 -6.9 0.00 -2.6 0.10 -4.1 0.00 -7.3 0.00 -5.9 0.00 
23 -3.8 0.00 -4.2 0.00 -4.0 0.00 -3.6 0.01 -5.2 0.00 -2.2 0.20 -4.4 0.00 -6.1 0.00 -4.2 0.00 
24 -4.2 0.00 -4.7 0.00 -4.2 0.00 -3.8 0.00 -4.9 0.00 -1.8 0.40 -4.8 0.00 -4.5 0.00 -4.7 0.00 
Notes: Bold test statistics are not significant at 5%. Probability based on MacKinnon (1996) one-sided test. Tested hypothesis is presence of unit root. 
Table 4. Estimation results BELPEX as function of PWXT 
 PWXT Constant  Wald-test1 Difference  
 Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob. Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 0.98 0.01 1.18 0.30 0.97 7.49 0.00 0.18 0.45 Rejected 
2 0.97 0.01 0.55 0.27 0.97 12.27 0.00 -0.37 -1.01 Rejected 
3 0.95 0.01 1.16 0.35 0.93 14.47 0.00 -0.35 -1.10 Rejected 
4 0.96 0.01 1.28 0.34 0.91 7.70 0.00 0.12 0.44 Rejected 
5 0.98 0.01 1.12 0.32 0.91 8.80 0.00 0.61 2.56 Rejected 
6 0.97 0.01 1.17 0.36 0.92 5.17 0.01 0.27 0.88 Rejected 
7 0.98 0.01 1.13 0.40 0.94 3.92 0.02 0.30 0.79 Rejected 
8 0.98 0.01 1.63 0.49 0.95 5.49 0.00 0.35 0.66 Rejected 
9 0.98 0.01 1.86 0.58 0.95 6.02 0.00 0.75 1.23 Rejected 
10 0.99 0.02 3.32 1.45 0.80 5.61 0.00 2.41 3.56 Rejected 
11 0.98 0.03 4.98 2.41 0.60 4.31 0.01 3.51 4.98 Rejected 
12 0.99 0.03 6.14 2.93 0.52 6.85 0.00 5.25 7.18 Rejected 
13 0.99 0.02 2.47 1.16 0.85 6.83 0.00 1.79 2.59 Rejected 
14 0.99 0.02 3.03 1.75 0.69 5.83 0.00 2.50 3.85 Rejected 
15 0.99 0.04 3.28 2.89 0.44 2.33 0.10 2.71 4.36 OK 
16 0.99 0.04 2.84 2.82 0.42 1.88 0.15 2.42 4.17 OK 
17 0.99 0.04 3.69 2.55 0.47 2.51 0.08 2.83 4.93 OK 
18 0.99 0.03 4.96 2.16 0.67 5.78 0.00 4.63 7.17 Rejected 
19 1.00 0.00 1.11 0.29 1.00 8.48 0.00 0.85 1.14 Rejected 
20 0.99 0.01 1.21 0.60 0.96 2.50 0.08 0.73 1.08 OK 
21 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.26 1.00 6.68 0.00 0.75 1.18 Rejected 
22 0.97 0.01 2.29 0.51 0.95 9.97 0.00 0.44 0.81 Rejected 
23 0.96 0.01 2.52 0.53 0.94 11.61 0.00 0.52 0.97 Rejected 
24 0.96 0.01 2.33 0.49 0.93 12.18 0.00 0.65 1.37 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
 
and a statistical test result indicating that the two series are identical. The reason for this is 
that the prices in non-peak hours are very stable (see Figure 2a in the previous section) so that 
small deviations may have a larger impact on the estimation results. Peak prices vary so much 
over time that relative small deviations do not impact on the estimated values of coefficients. 
This is reflected in the value of the R2, which is often lower in peak hours than in non-peak 
hours. Overall, we conclude from Table 4 that the wholesale electricity prices in Belgian and 
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France are somewhat close to each other on many moments, but that there are still some 
significant differences. 
 
A similar conclusion, applies to a comparison of all other individual countries with respect to 
one another: these relationships are often less tight than the relationship between Belgian 
electricity prices and those in France; see Table 5 for details. Full integration is rejected for all 
country comparisons for nearly all hours.13 Sometimes, however, price differences are very 
small in the majority of time periods. 
 
Table 5. Number of hours for which convergence between wholesale electricity prices in 
two countries is not rejected 
 APX BELPEX EEX EXAA IPEX NordPool Omel POLPX PWXT 
APX - 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 
BELPEX 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
EEX 0 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 1 
EXAA 1 5 5 - 0 0 0 0 4 
IPEX 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 
NordPool 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 
Omel 0 1 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 
POLPX 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 
PWXT 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
 
3.3 Comparing individual country prices with a composite price 
Next, we present the results of a similar analysis as before, but now replacing individual 
country data by a composite price as explanatory variable, where this composite price is 
constructed out of the original individual country prices in such a way that at each time period 
the composite price is the individual country’s price that is closest to the price of the country 
we with to investigate. As explained before, the idea behind this construction is that because 
of the homogeneity of electricity and the perfect arbitrage possibilities, electricity flows to 
wherever the price is lowest if there is sufficient interconnection capacity. So, in this way we 
can test whether there is any moment in time where an individual country’s electricity prices 
are different from any of its neighboring countries. If not, then one can rightfully claim that 
the wholesale electricity market is always larger than the country itself. To show the results of 
                                                 
13 Full tables are available on request. 
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this analysis, we again first concentrate on Belgium and report a full set of results for this 
country and then continue to report the overall results in a more summarizing fashion. 
Table 6. Estimation results BELPEX as function of MIX 
 MIX     Constant  Wald-test1 Difference  
 Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob. Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 1.00 0.00 -0.03 0.03 1.00 0.77 0.47 0.01 0.02 OK 
2 1.00 0.00 -0.02 0.03 1.00 0.90 0.41 -0.02 -0.05 OK 
3 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00 1.10 0.33 -0.02 -0.05 OK 
4 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 1.00 4.20 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 Rejected 
5 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 1.00 4.67 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 Rejected 
6 1.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 1.00 3.07 0.05 0.01 0.03 Rejected 
7 1.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05 1.00 1.29 0.28 0.03 0.08 OK 
8 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 1.00 0.80 0.45 0.06 0.11 OK 
9 1.00 0.00 -0.03 0.20 0.99 1.67 0.19 0.15 0.24 OK 
10 1.00 0.00 0.08 0.16 1.00 0.66 0.52 0.09 0.14 OK 
11 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.12 1.00 1.10 0.33 0.09 0.12 OK 
12 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.17 1.00 0.59 0.56 0.10 0.13 OK 
13 1.00 0.00 -0.02 0.14 1.00 1.07 0.34 0.08 0.11 OK 
14 1.00 0.00 0.26 0.20 1.00 0.97 0.38 0.02 0.03 OK 
15 1.00 0.00 -0.02 0.12 1.00 0.21 0.81 0.03 0.04 OK 
16 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 1.00 0.29 0.75 0.04 0.07 OK 
17 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 1.00 0.45 0.64 0.05 0.08 OK 
18 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.14 1.00 1.81 0.16 0.15 0.22 OK 
19 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 1.00 0.68 0.51 0.04 0.05 OK 
20 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 1.00 0.09 0.92 -0.01 -0.01 OK 
21 1.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04 1.00 0.27 0.76 0.00 0.00 OK 
22 1.00 0.00 -0.08 0.08 1.00 1.65 0.19 0.04 0.07 OK 
23 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.07 1.00 5.74 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 Rejected 
24 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 1.00 0.54 0.58 0.02 0.05 OK 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
 
Table 6 presents the following interesting results that come out of our analysis. At any 
moment in time the estimated slope β coefficient of Equation (1) is exactly equal to 1.00, 
whereas the estimated coefficient α coefficient of Equation (1) is close to 0.00 and the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient equals 0 cannot be rejected for almost any hour. Moreover, for 
every hour the R2 is exactly equal to 1.00 (or just differs by less than 0.01). This means that 
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two time series are really almost identical at any moment in time and the statistical Wald-test 
only rejects the hypothesis that the two series are identical in four of the non-peak hours 4, 5, 
6 and 23 (but this is again due to the fact that the time series in these hours are very stable and 
that therefore any small difference clearly sticks out). Statistical significance in this case also 
coincides with economic significance: the average price difference in any hour is less than 
€ 0.26 and for most hours it is clearly less than €0.10! We conclude from this that at any point 
in time there is no separate Belgian wholesale electricity market and that the market is always 
intimately connected to at least one other country and no electricity company can enjoy 
market power in a separate Belgian market.  
 
It is of course important to know how the composite MIX index is composed. It turns out that 
the non-neighboring countries’ prices are never used and German prices are almost never used 
as the basis for the composite price and that both the French and Dutch prices account for 
around 50% of the cases (see table 7 below). Therefore, Belgian electricity prices are 
intimately connected to the corresponding prices of these two neighboring countries. 
 
We next present the results of the same analysis for the other countries to see whether the 
same result applies to other countries as well. Table 7 reports what the constituent parts for 
the composite mix price index are for each individual country. Table 8a reports the overall 
results for peak hours and table 8b presents the results for non-peak hours.  
 
Table 7 shows that for five countries in the dataset, the composite mix price index is mostly 
composed of the price data in the countries with which it is mostly integrated. For Belgium, 
these are exclusively France and the Netherlands, and for France and the Netherlands, these 
are mostly the other two countries for which the markets are coupled. For Austria and 
Germany most of the connections are with the former three countries and with each other. For 
the remaining countries the mix does not seem to follow a clear pattern.  
 
Using these composite mixed variables, Tables 8a and 8b then provide the main results of our 
analysis.14 Table 8a summarizes the main components of the regression results where 
individual country data for peak hours are explained in terms of the composite MIX data. 
From the table it is clear that the French and Dutch wholesale electricity prices can be very 
                                                 
14 Full results are included in Appendix B. 
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well explained by the composite mix variable. The R2 is typically very high, the percentage 
deviation from the mean is often less than 0.1% and even if convergence is formally rejected 
from a statistical point of view (which in the peak hours actually never happens for France), 
then the difference from the mean is still less than 1%. One can also clearly see that Austria 
and Germany are also quite well integrated with Belgium, France and the Netherlands, 
although the convergence is less strong for these two countries as it is for the former three 
countries. Given the market coupling of the wholesale prices in The Netherlands, France and 
Belgium this should not be very surprising.15 It is clear that for the remaining countries, 
convergence does not obtain even if we consider the composite mix variable. Convergence is 
formally rejected for all hours (apart from 2 hours for Poland) and the percentage deviation 
from the mean can easily be more than 10%. 
Table 7. Composition of MIX prices in percentage of total observations 
 APX BELPEX EEX EXAA IPEX NordPool Omel POLPX PWXT 
APX 0 34 24 14 10 3 7 12 68 
BELPEX 34 0 3 1 1 0 1 2 21 
EEX 4 0 0 27 14 15 13 16 3 
EXAA 8 0 33 0 14 14 10 15 3 
IPEX 2 0 6 5 0 3 13 5 1 
NordPool 1 0 11 8 5 0 13 24 1 
Omel 2 0 12 8 31 17 0 27 2 
POLPX 2 0 3 11 10 36 28 0 1 
PWXT 46 65 7 26 15 11 15 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The analysis in Table 8b for non-peak hours confirms the results for peak hours. Even though 
for some hours, the formal test of convergence is rejected for France and the Netherlands, the 
R2 is typically 0.99 or higher and the percentage deviation from the mean is usually as small 
as 0.1%. Austria and Germany are also well integrated with at least one other country 
indicating that there is a group of roughly five countries that can be said to form the forefront 
of the integration of European wholesale electricity markets. Our methodology of looking at a 
composite index with which a country is integrated does not help for the remaining countries 
(Italy, Spain, Poland and the Scandinavian countries): even with the composite index, 
convergence should be rejected.  
                                                 
15 Using electricity price data for the United States, Park et al. (2006) shows that a similar institutional 
framework (like trading structures) rather than physical connections explains integration of some markets. 
Table 8a. Estimation results for peak hours for all countries as function of their MIX  
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
APX R2 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 
 % mean1 0.04 0.57 0.89 1.30 0.93 0.96 0.60 0.86 0.32 0.42 0.14 0.39 
 Conclusion2 OK R R R OK OK OK OK R R R OK 
EEX R2 0.72 0.94 0.92 0.68 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.97 0.97 0.77 0.59 0.86 
 % mean 2.12 -0.02 0.44 3.71 1.33 0.76 0.23 -1.18 -0.98 0.77 2.49 0.29 
 Conclusion OK OK OK R R OK OK R R OK OK OK 
EXAA R2 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.97 
 % mean 0.24 -0.13 -0.02 0.37 0.59 0.03 -0.40 -0.17 0.03 1.90 0.88 0.57 
 Conclusion OK R R OK R OK R OK R R R R 
IPEX R2 0.56 0.30 0.26 0.36 0.50 0.58 0.39 0.28 0.28 0.49 0.51 0.57 
 % mean 32.89 49.80 50.66 36.83 22.46 19.95 30.08 44.32 55.44 44.89 38.43 34.08 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
NordPool R2 0.78 0.73 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.65 
 % mean -10.18 -14.31 -16.39 -18.54 -19.81 -19.12 -16.75 -15.40 -14.87 -14.69 -17.86 -20.38 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Omel R2 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.87 
 % mean 2.36 2.47 3.72 2.70 2.64 3.15 2.24 2.40 3.58 3.38 3.34 2.91 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
POLPX R2 0.79 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.66 0.46 0.30 0.20 
 % mean 4.05 -0.17 -0.14 -1.81 -2.30 -3.64 -1.48 -6.60 -17.68 -24.59 -44.53 -52.56 
 Conclusion R OK OK R R R R R R R R R 
PWXT R2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 % mean -0.18 -0.16 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.17 -0.12 0.08 
 Conclusion OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK 
1. The percentage mean (% mean) is calculated as = 
)(
)(*)1(
,
,
th
th
Mixmean
Mixmean 
. Where α and β are the estimated coefficients. 2. The letter R means rejected. 
 
 20
Table 8b. Estimation results for non-peak hours for all countries as function of their MIX  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 21 22 23 24 
APX R2 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 
 % mean1 0.57 0.17 -0.16 0.11 -0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.20 0.07 0.17 -0.03 0.24 
 Conclusion2 R OK OK OK OK OK OK R R R OK R 
EEX R2 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.87 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 
 % mean -1.25 -2.53 -3.15 -4.06 -2.18 0.09 -0.69 0.80 -0.24 -0.85 -0.85 -2.30 
 Conclusion R R R R R OK R OK OK R R R 
EXAA R2 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 
 % mean -1.11 -1.39 -1.86 -1.68 -0.60 -0.57 -0.22 0.32 0.41 0.09 0.05 -0.85 
 Conclusion R R R R OK OK OK OK OK OK OK R 
IPEX R2 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.54 0.44 0.69 0.68 
 % mean 13.13 10.38 8.42 7.99 8.19 10.82 18.59 17.99 37.11 29.96 17.34 15.69 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
NordPool R2 0.75 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.84 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.71 
 % mean -10.74 -6.39 -3.58 -1.27 -0.30 -3.36 -7.39 -6.87 -20.53 -16.39 -16.77 -12.78 
 Conclusion R R R OK OK R R R R R R R 
Omel R2 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.89 
 % mean 5.03 5.78 5.70 7.16 6.81 3.71 1.23 2.82 2.99 3.10 2.79 3.28 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
POLPX R2 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.49 0.43 0.40 0.46 0.65 0.27 0.49 0.61 0.73 
 % mean 6.83 35.80 48.96 80.97 100.82 66.41 30.89 17.34 -48.89 -40.03 -33.46 -13.64 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
PWXT R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
 % mean -0.16 0.13 0.45 -0.13 -0.86 -0.20 -0.46 -0.36 -0.01 0.15 0.12 0.15 
 Conclusion OK OK R OK R OK R OK OK OK OK OK 
1 The percentage mean (% mean) is calculated as = 
)(
)(*)1(
,
,
th
th
Mixmean
Mixmean 
. Where α and β are the estimated coefficients. 2. The letter R means rejected. 
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Table 9a. Estimation results for peak hours for all countries as function of their MIX: first differences  
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
APX R2 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.87 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.94 
 % mean1 0.76 0.48 -0.02 -0.41 1.29 0.74 0.55 0.62 0.26 2.47 -0.74 1.26 
 Conclusion2 OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK R OK OK 
BELPEX R2 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 % mean -0.07 -0.24 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.74 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 
 Conclusion OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK 
EEX R2 0.50 0.86 0.83 0.50 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.89 0.90 0.70 0.45 0.72 
 % mean -12.13 -2.64 -5.13 -12.88 -14.75 -7.01 -6.48 -4.56 -3.45 -5.68 -12.98 -3.24 
 Conclusion R OK R R R R R R R OK R OK 
EXAA R2 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.94 
 % mean -3.30 -6.21 -5.67 -2.86 -0.95 -1.66 -3.64 -2.69 -3.10 1.62 -1.25 2.58 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
IPEX R2 0.42 0.23 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.42 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.48 0.48 0.45 
 % mean -48.60 -74.42 -76.96 -61.58 -46.29 -33.44 -42.79 -47.86 -51.68 -48.74 -46.82 -45.49 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
NordPool R2 0.27 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.02 
 % mean -25.39 -32.50 -36.40 -37.43 -37.24 -35.22 -33.46 -32.35 -31.71 -33.67 -42.42 -45.06 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Omel R2 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.63 
 % mean -7.18 -9.97 -16.54 -18.64 -18.64 -17.70 -14.84 -11.07 -10.91 -13.54 -18.97 -19.42 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
POLPX R2 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.42 0.51 0.51 0.38 0.21 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.13 
 % mean -25.39 -21.22 -19.81 -20.47 -16.04 -14.09 -15.87 -21.84 -24.41 -32.35 -28.44 -40.47 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
PWXT R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 % mean -0.05 0.07 -0.13 -0.69 -0.69 -0.81 -0.78 -0.31 -0.14 0.11 -0.09 -0.40 
 Conclusion OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK 
1. The percentage mean (% mean) is calculated as = 
)(
)(*)1(
,
,
th
th
Mixstdev
Mixstdev 
. Where α and β are the estimated coefficients. 2. The letter R means rejected. 
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Table 9b. Estimation results for non-peak hours for all countries as function of their MIX: first differences  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 21 22 23 24 
APX R2 0.69 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.88 0.94 0.88 0.81 0.77 0.67 
 % mean1 4.90 2.13 2.00 0.86 0.92 1.39 1.60 0.69 -0.82 -0.11 -4.44 -6.17 
 Conclusion2 R R R R R OK OK OK OK OK R R 
BELPEX R2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 % mean 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.00 -0.11 -0.20 0.02 0.05 -0.47 -0.01 
 Conclusion OK OK OK OK R OK OK OK OK OK R OK 
EEX R2 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.82 0.74 0.85 0.77 0.72 0.58 
 % mean -0.43 0.55 1.07 1.84 -0.51 -4.51 -0.76 -1.98 -3.84 -5.55 -4.40 -6.17 
 Conclusion OK OK R R R R OK OK R R R R 
EXAA R2 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.86 0.79 0.71 
 % mean -3.28 -2.42 -0.88 -0.15 -1.45 -2.67 -2.43 -1.51 -3.22 -3.86 -5.20 -6.09 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
IPEX R2 0.38 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.60 0.33 0.17 0.32 0.27 
 % mean -10.53 1.29 7.58 10.89 11.52 4.96 -9.38 -23.46 -56.12 -53.02 -28.10 -23.63 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
NordPool R2 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.10 
 % mean -31.86 -29.96 -27.67 -27.10 -27.74 -27.83 -29.20 -29.87 -42.98 -33.73 -32.83 -33.63 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
Omel R2 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.55 0.58 0.54 0.48 0.49 
 % mean -15.44 -12.38 -6.35 -4.46 -1.82 -1.46 -4.22 -7.40 -20.55 -25.75 -20.54 -15.02 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
POLPX R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.05 
 % mean -32.69 -48.06 -50.13 -74.86 -85.93 -65.04 -31.47 -31.49 -44.00 -33.67 -37.31 -35.26 
 Conclusion R R R R R R R R R R R R 
PWXT R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.95 
 % mean 2.27 0.89 -0.36 -0.10 0.56 -0.22 0.73 -0.14 -0.17 -0.52 0.89 0.93 
 Conclusion R R R OK OK OK OK OK OK OK OK R 
1. The percentage mean (% mean) is calculated as = 
)(
)(*)1(
,
,
th
th
Mixstdev
Mixstdev 
. Where α and β are the estimated coefficients. 2. The letter R means rejected. 
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3.4 Analysis in first-differences 
As a robustness check, we have also done a similar analysis using first-order differences 
rather than the original time series in absolute values. A first-order difference analysis is 
appropriate especially in case the time series are not stationary. Above, we have argued that 
the Dickey-Fuller test tells us that stationarity cannot be rejected for most time series. 
Nevertheless, the analysis in first-order differences can be used as a robustness check. The 
results of this analysis are reported in Tables 9a and 9b.16 Table 9 confirms the overall picture 
of Table 8, but makes the distinction between the three groups of countries even more 
pronounced. For the Belgian market, there are now only two non-peak hours where the formal 
test of convergence is rejected and we therefore conclude that the Belgian market is almost 
fully integrated with the Dutch and French markets and this market should not be analyzed in 
isolation of other markets at any time of the day. Indeed, the R2 is also 1.00 in the two cases 
where convergence is rejected. Also for France and The Netherlands, the conclusion is that 
almost at any hour there is another country that imposes a competitive constraint. For the 
important peak hours, this is true in all hours, apart from one for The Netherlands. The results 
for Austria and Germany show, however, that the case for convergence is more problematic 
than it seems to be the case for the analysis in absolute terms presented in Table 8. 
Convergence has to be rejected for almost all hours, especially for Austria. The results for the 
remaining countries confirm the idea that they are not integrated with the rest of Europe.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that one has to be careful in defining electricity wholesale 
markets in Europe. Standard techniques of market definition suggest that the researcher 
investigates whether the conditions under which product B is provided impose a competitive 
constraint on the pricing behavior of firms producing product A. And similarly for products 
C, D, etc. If no such a product would impose a competitive constraint, then it is argued that 
product A is to be regarded as being in a separate market. If we would apply this line of 
argument to the European wholesale electricity market, one would conclude that each country 
constitutes its own separate market. Or, more precisely, there are significant parts of the day 
where the market in a country behaves differently from markets in each of its neighboring 
countries. If one takes into account the possibility that product B or C (at least one of them at 
each moment in time) impose a competitive constraint on the pricing behavior of firms 
                                                 
16 The absolute value of the average price difference as reported in Table 5 is not given in Table 6 as the average 
of the first difference is (nearly) zero in all cases.  
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producing product A, then our analysis clearly shows that Belgium should not be regarded as 
having a separate wholesale electricity market. The same conclusion applies, but a little less 
strongly, to France and The Netherlands. The results for Austria and Germany are more 
ambiguous and depend on whether the analysis is carried our in absolute numbers or in first 
differences. On the basis of our results one can conclude that the wholesale electricity markets 
of the countries that have coupled their markets (Belgium, France and The Netherlands) 
should be considered as one and at the forefront of one European wholesale electricity market 
with Austria and Germany following at some distance. 
 
Our analysis has thus two important conclusions. It points at a weakness of the standard 
approach towards market definition, especially when applied to wholesale electricity markets. 
Our alternative is to take a mix of countries into account when considering whether these 
countries together can impose a competitive constraint. Moreover, at a more substantial level 
it argues that it is misleading to analyze the wholesale electricity market in quite a few 
individual member states (in particular Belgium and neighboring countries) as if it is a market 
that is separated from its neighbors. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics 
  Own price MIX 
 Hour  Mean Max Min  StDev Mean  Max  Min  StDev 
APX 1 40.80 200.97 8.01 17.99 40.56 80.24 8.01 16.97 
 2 35.51 95.57 4.00 15.85 35.45 71.67 5.00 15.68 
 3 31.62 85.12 0.88 14.85 31.64 68.50 2.00 14.71 
 4 27.50 79.93 1.09 13.90 27.45 63.37 1.09 13.83 
 5 26.25 75.57 1.00 14.13 26.26 64.17 0.59 14.00 
 6 32.14 75.00 1.00 15.50 32.11 70.00 1.40 15.39 
 7 39.33 90.00 0.50 20.91 39.30 90.00 0.07 20.85 
 8 54.43 148.77 1.00 28.97 54.54 148.77 1.00 29.11 
 9 62.10 227.13 7.31 31.44 62.08 227.13 7.31 31.55 
 10 70.71 400.00 6.31 38.68 70.30 400.00 6.31 38.65 
 11 75.63 800.00 7.81 47.26 74.96 800.00 7.81 47.12 
 12 82.04 950.00 9.31 53.97 80.98 950.00 9.31 52.91 
 13 72.09 350.00 21.70 33.17 71.43 350.00 21.70 32.31 
 14 69.17 520.01 14.01 35.55 68.52 520.01 14.01 34.82 
 15 66.12 950.00 9.18 45.01 65.72 950.00 9.18 44.57 
 16 61.11 950.00 9.17 43.68 60.59 950.00 9.17 43.12 
 17 60.37 950.00 5.98 43.85 60.18 950.00 5.98 43.91 
 18 70.49 850.00 9.10 60.97 70.19 850.00 9.10 59.93 
 19 71.55 476.00 19.91 47.41 71.45 519.93 19.30 47.82 
 20 66.03 300.00 18.94 31.71 65.78 300.00 18.94 31.43 
 21 60.65 139.00 20.00 24.24 60.61 140.30 19.89 24.48 
 22 53.08 115.72 20.97 20.42 52.99 115.72 20.97 20.52 
 23 51.09 125.00 19.90 19.44 51.11 125.00 19.90 19.43 
 24 46.36 120.00 16.30 18.67 46.28 120.00 16.30 18.69 
BELPEX 1 40.63 95.90 8.01 18.55 40.66 95.90 8.01 18.55 
 2 35.69 88.10 3.20 17.22 35.73 88.10 5.00 17.23 
 3 31.67 71.91 2.35 16.02 31.66 71.92 2.35 16.05 
 4 26.59 63.94 1.09 14.70 26.59 65.00 1.09 14.77 
 5 24.57 64.17 0.96 14.79 24.56 64.17 0.96 14.85 
 6 31.05 70.03 2.60 16.48 31.02 70.03 2.60 16.50 
 7 38.46 100.01 0.07 22.32 38.38 100.01 0.07 22.32 
 8 54.52 179.32 1.00 31.25 54.43 179.32 1.00 31.22 
 9 62.05 227.13 7.31 33.65 61.84 227.13 7.31 33.48 
 10 70.21 500.00 6.31 44.26 70.04 500.00 6.31 44.21 
 11 73.96 800.00 7.17 52.79 73.90 800.00 7.81 52.74 
 12 78.39 950.00 8.99 55.67 78.37 950.00 9.31 55.61 
 13 70.94 350.14 13.98 34.82 70.92 350.14 19.04 34.75 
 14 67.36 520.01 4.95 35.82 67.41 520.01 14.01 35.88 
 15 64.97 950.00 8.03 45.48 64.94 950.00 9.18 45.41 
 16 60.34 950.00 6.51 44.16 60.33 950.00 9.17 44.17 
 17 60.19 950.00 5.98 47.63 60.10 950.00 5.98 47.66 
 18 69.30 850.00 9.10 64.16 69.10 850.00 9.10 64.05 
 19 74.97 1,762.54 6.90 89.79 74.94 1,762.54 13.03 89.75 
 20 68.10 1,066.82 10.41 52.32 68.11 1,066.82 14.10 52.33 
 21 64.29 2,500.00 5.53 94.28 64.34 2,500.00 13.10 94.31 
 22 54.44 300.03 8.36 25.03 54.41 300.03 13.09 24.95 
 23 54.12 179.30 18.92 22.33 54.20 179.30 18.92 22.39 
 24 48.30 210.10 16.09 21.23 48.34 210.10 16.09 21.22 
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  Own price MIX 
 Hour  Mean Max Min  StDev Mean  Max  Min  StDev 
EEX 1 37.69 76.02 1.64 16.24 38.17 75.01 8.72 15.91 
 2 32.71 71.07 0.62 15.24 33.46 70.97 0.55 14.83 
 3 29.28 67.93 0.25 14.37 30.20 68.50 1.00 13.58 
 4 26.52 69.52 0.05 13.73 27.63 71.89 1.00 12.85 
 5 27.02 69.92 0.10 13.99 27.56 70.71 1.00 13.31 
 6 32.81 70.51 0.02 15.70 32.69 69.75 1.00 15.04 
 7 38.52 104.93 2.16 22.27 38.12 93.21 0.60 21.03 
 8 54.48 301.01 0.07 32.61 53.59 149.48 1.00 29.95 
 9 60.26 437.26 0.33 34.80 58.95 192.01 6.00 30.50 
 10 64.75 249.92 5.46 33.43 64.68 186.41 6.31 32.48 
 11 68.47 240.71 0.50 34.85 68.17 200.36 7.81 33.64 
 12 75.59 387.11 5.56 41.87 72.88 200.00 9.31 35.80 
 13 67.00 216.01 6.96 30.83 66.12 168.05 19.72 29.57 
 14 63.01 250.22 2.65 30.49 62.53 147.54 14.01 28.67 
 15 59.40 188.48 0.07 30.30 59.27 156.02 9.18 29.16 
 16 55.46 195.00 0.12 28.03 56.12 143.41 9.93 28.02 
 17 54.60 250.04 3.86 28.02 55.14 195.42 8.17 27.79 
 18 62.03 821.90 10.95 49.25 61.55 769.47 9.18 43.68 
 19 65.54 701.01 15.95 44.08 63.94 378.72 16.40 35.49 
 20 61.38 299.09 17.97 31.33 61.20 196.59 15.87 29.08 
 21 56.18 194.62 15.07 25.38 56.32 139.00 19.71 24.92 
 22 49.08 118.93 13.48 20.69 49.50 116.84 20.06 20.55 
 23 47.28 94.82 14.65 18.83 47.69 91.25 20.23 18.64 
 24 38.78 80.98 1.61 16.53 39.69 80.19 12.96 16.42 
EXAA 1 37.48 81.00 6.83 15.25 37.90 74.10 11.12 15.18 
 2 32.21 68.53 0.55 14.18 32.69 70.32 0.62 14.21 
 3 28.59 65.64 0.01 13.40 29.31 65.00 1.52 13.22 
 4 26.11 63.27 0.01 12.78 26.69 63.47 0.06 12.73 
 5 26.50 62.95 0.01 13.13 26.76 63.00 1.00 12.97 
 6 31.74 71.48 0.01 15.14 32.04 70.00 0.87 14.95 
 7 37.91 97.37 0.01 21.33 38.54 93.83 0.14 20.72 
 8 54.57 150.00 0.01 30.68 54.81 153.78 0.75 30.14 
 9 60.39 192.01 0.01 31.17 60.25 192.80 4.01 31.08 
 10 65.41 200.51 11.00 32.14 65.49 200.00 8.68 32.83 
 11 69.17 200.36 11.67 33.35 69.18 204.89 7.81 34.01 
 12 75.59 248.27 0.07 37.48 75.30 226.32 5.56 37.13 
 13 67.95 183.33 20.60 30.82 67.55 173.30 19.72 30.33 
 14 63.79 170.00 17.00 29.78 63.77 172.28 17.12 29.58 
 15 60.01 153.60 3.51 29.06 60.25 164.04 11.16 29.28 
 16 56.73 156.27 11.27 27.71 56.83 159.08 9.91 27.64 
 17 57.14 180.02 9.83 29.16 57.12 197.87 3.86 29.27 
 18 65.90 517.55 12.68 48.76 64.68 596.94 11.58 46.30 
 19 69.31 519.93 17.60 47.68 68.71 476.00 18.54 46.94 
 20 63.74 302.37 20.00 32.42 63.37 210.00 19.37 31.01 
 21 57.38 137.15 20.31 24.94 57.15 140.02 15.07 24.86 
 22 50.16 112.59 9.99 20.44 50.11 114.00 13.48 20.37 
 23 47.97 94.94 1.00 18.79 47.95 95.38 19.90 18.64 
 24 39.48 81.21 1.00 16.49 39.82 83.22 9.15 16.37 
          
          
 28
  Own price MIX 
 Hour  Mean Max Min  StDev Mean  Max  Min  StDev 
IPEX 1 53.86 110.00 22.54 14.83 47.61 85.00 21.68 15.00 
 2 45.93 92.65 22.00 15.21 41.61 79.91 19.49 14.28 
 3 40.22 84.76 21.44 14.27 37.09 71.91 18.35 12.91 
 4 37.11 75.89 21.44 12.87 34.36 70.00 16.94 11.64 
 5 36.61 73.63 21.52 12.33 33.84 69.92 18.51 11.19 
 6 41.47 75.02 22.00 13.45 37.42 70.51 18.52 13.08 
 7 54.10 93.83 22.04 15.74 45.62 89.25 19.03 17.27 
 8 70.59 137.60 22.05 22.05 59.83 139.48 20.07 25.88 
 9 88.97 176.94 21.63 23.68 66.96 180.42 18.27 28.53 
 10 111.11 215.55 26.63 31.23 74.17 200.00 26.61 32.59 
 11 118.12 209.96 39.17 34.09 78.40 200.36 27.05 33.60 
 12 113.03 211.99 46.61 33.98 82.60 200.00 28.76 35.05 
 13 89.75 194.83 43.30 23.89 73.29 171.03 29.34 26.95 
 14 84.53 179.12 23.64 23.69 70.47 165.09 23.67 25.57 
 15 89.54 197.41 24.67 29.18 68.83 164.04 26.05 27.17 
 16 94.02 209.80 23.66 32.72 65.15 159.08 20.06 25.76 
 17 102.11 198.51 23.61 37.57 65.69 205.80 19.93 27.79 
 18 104.53 239.52 23.32 41.57 72.14 301.15 22.14 37.48 
 19 103.64 242.42 22.00 39.28 74.87 301.50 21.40 38.10 
 20 96.60 190.01 41.90 26.48 72.05 180.02 27.15 30.46 
 21 93.64 162.63 49.35 20.37 68.29 142.73 29.15 25.01 
 22 83.82 150.14 46.27 17.94 64.50 118.04 29.48 20.07 
 23 69.24 116.58 43.90 15.13 59.01 110.03 29.61 17.91 
 24 60.63 110.45 22.00 13.60 52.37 103.78 21.52 16.68 
NordPool 1 32.82 67.16 3.92 13.95 36.77 70.05 6.98 13.78 
 2 31.37 65.94 3.73 13.95 33.51 66.14 2.76 13.42 
 3 30.21 64.93 3.07 13.88 31.33 65.00 2.06 13.09 
 4 29.51 63.96 2.87 13.86 29.88 64.00 2.07 13.08 
 5 29.74 65.12 2.48 14.06 29.83 62.92 1.96 13.27 
 6 31.42 67.83 2.35 14.36 32.51 67.95 1.05 13.63 
 7 33.95 75.74 2.04 14.68 36.71 80.95 3.49 15.66 
 8 37.15 78.33 2.71 15.01 39.89 79.06 1.13 15.46 
 9 39.02 80.18 4.59 15.16 43.45 99.56 9.92 15.96 
 10 39.26 76.26 7.32 14.71 45.82 88.60 14.06 16.64 
 11 39.41 76.22 9.15 14.48 47.13 89.55 17.08 17.63 
 12 39.10 76.24 11.14 14.33 48.00 91.00 16.04 17.93 
 13 38.52 74.79 10.85 14.29 48.04 93.38 19.04 18.20 
 14 37.93 74.52 9.22 14.34 46.89 91.31 17.00 18.05 
 15 37.42 74.14 7.45 14.37 44.95 88.33 14.97 16.76 
 16 37.02 74.03 7.31 14.35 43.76 87.41 15.02 16.39 
 17 37.14 73.64 7.35 14.48 43.63 100.00 14.98 16.15 
 18 38.19 99.91 9.80 14.82 44.77 80.87 15.95 16.40 
 19 38.17 74.12 11.09 14.33 46.47 90.00 17.90 17.50 
 20 37.63 77.94 10.61 14.23 47.26 96.75 16.32 17.92 
 21 36.95 76.16 8.73 14.16 46.49 95.36 17.86 18.29 
 22 36.57 73.90 8.40 13.91 43.73 87.00 15.47 15.88 
 23 35.88 72.08 8.60 13.71 43.12 76.47 15.17 15.58 
 24 33.66 68.70 5.91 13.84 38.59 71.42 16.09 14.52 
          
          
 29
  Own price MIX 
 Hour  Mean Max Min  StDev Mean  Max  Min  StDev 
Omel 1 48.13 90.00 18.50 15.57 45.83 87.00 22.47 15.22 
 2 43.63 87.69 6.50 14.76 41.24 83.33 16.10 14.81 
 3 39.67 80.01 1.00 14.13 37.53 77.21 13.99 13.59 
 4 38.16 70.00 5.00 13.68 35.61 75.89 11.78 13.10 
 5 36.81 66.01 5.00 13.71 34.46 73.26 9.17 12.78 
 6 37.51 66.32 5.00 13.87 36.17 71.16 7.15 13.50 
 7 41.28 76.30 6.50 14.76 40.78 75.96 6.00 15.05 
 8 46.18 83.90 5.00 16.72 44.91 100.00 4.46 16.59 
 9 49.99 92.82 5.00 17.62 48.84 103.00 8.18 17.75 
 10 53.42 95.68 10.00 17.71 52.13 101.96 11.41 18.05 
 11 57.23 99.05 18.67 17.80 55.18 102.32 18.27 18.49 
 12 58.01 99.13 18.67 17.29 56.48 109.35 22.33 18.48 
 13 58.50 99.16 19.00 17.22 56.99 106.31 23.21 18.55 
 14 57.31 96.62 20.10 16.89 55.56 103.82 21.43 18.36 
 15 52.85 89.92 20.10 15.93 51.69 94.42 19.60 16.91 
 16 51.21 91.00 20.00 15.80 50.01 90.48 17.20 16.60 
 17 51.13 90.00 16.00 16.26 49.36 97.98 13.44 16.53 
 18 52.80 90.77 18.67 17.04 51.08 104.93 17.90 17.51 
 19 56.16 129.99 20.00 19.03 54.34 112.91 21.61 19.95 
 20 58.11 130.00 23.24 20.01 56.47 137.70 20.00 21.53 
 21 59.47 103.09 24.00 19.89 57.75 120.81 23.02 21.31 
 22 60.82 100.00 25.64 18.32 58.99 115.03 25.29 21.03 
 23 55.91 95.00 23.50 17.16 54.40 96.07 23.47 18.00 
 24 51.15 93.36 0.00 17.16 49.52 89.93 0.00 16.75 
POLPX 1 39.85 66.92 19.76 13.50 37.28 66.46 15.40 12.86 
 2 44.06 77.75 26.96 15.41 32.41 65.05 10.33 11.40 
 3 44.59 87.68 24.96 15.98 29.86 64.12 9.07 10.26 
 4 51.66 145.44 24.96 24.86 28.42 62.50 6.40 9.30 
 5 55.22 166.10 23.58 29.54 27.33 62.50 9.04 8.53 
 6 50.70 166.87 18.76 23.21 30.32 63.56 9.04 10.53 
 7 49.63 166.87 18.76 23.07 37.84 76.26 8.52 14.32 
 8 47.12 147.19 18.25 17.97 40.17 89.99 7.93 15.02 
 9 45.88 142.17 18.76 18.20 44.09 85.33 11.63 15.91 
 10 47.45 142.17 18.76 19.48 47.54 112.51 11.41 18.15 
 11 49.01 142.17 19.54 20.73 49.08 125.61 18.51 19.70 
 12 49.31 142.17 18.32 21.37 50.22 132.65 15.28 21.20 
 13 49.18 142.17 18.27 21.32 50.26 125.09 15.22 21.79 
 14 48.23 142.17 18.27 20.38 50.05 122.65 15.21 21.08 
 15 47.04 142.17 18.27 19.55 47.75 115.05 15.10 19.21 
 16 43.29 90.52 18.24 16.06 46.36 107.23 14.73 18.01 
 17 38.68 83.16 17.98 14.39 47.02 102.76 17.69 17.88 
 18 37.17 72.69 17.98 13.52 49.19 177.75 20.16 22.40 
 19 28.29 64.67 15.84 8.02 50.98 177.82 18.54 23.27 
 20 26.12 53.92 17.98 6.68 55.04 160.70 22.30 27.89 
 21 26.72 54.46 2.11 7.66 52.27 157.22 24.00 24.06 
 22 27.36 59.09 18.05 8.09 45.61 93.17 23.51 16.54 
 23 30.00 63.44 18.21 9.24 45.07 79.85 23.72 15.74 
 24 35.06 65.78 18.57 11.29 40.57 75.00 20.16 14.38 
          
          
 30
  Own price MIX 
 Hour  Mean Max Min  StDev Mean  Max  Min  StDev 
PWXT 1 40.51 95.90 0.05 18.70 40.40 95.90 8.01 18.56 
 2 36.14 88.10 8.17 17.40 35.95 88.10 8.17 17.29 
 3 32.11 81.65 4.49 16.26 31.95 72.14 7.05 16.02 
 4 26.48 66.00 3.40 14.64 26.44 63.94 3.40 14.56 
 5 23.91 63.00 0.04 14.43 24.14 63.00 0.96 14.41 
 6 30.75 70.03 4.58 16.30 30.82 70.03 4.58 16.27 
 7 38.09 100.01 0.07 22.13 38.10 100.01 0.07 22.04 
 8 54.05 179.32 1.29 31.29 54.33 179.32 1.29 31.14 
 9 61.16 227.13 6.30 33.45 61.28 227.13 7.31 33.45 
 10 67.72 500.00 6.31 40.05 67.81 500.00 6.31 40.10 
 11 70.44 500.00 7.81 41.84 70.52 500.00 7.81 41.85 
 12 73.13 500.00 9.31 40.72 73.17 500.00 9.31 40.93 
 13 69.15 350.14 19.04 32.49 69.08 350.14 19.04 32.72 
 14 64.86 178.01 14.01 30.03 64.62 178.01 14.01 30.17 
 15 62.25 169.02 9.18 30.30 62.21 169.02 9.18 30.44 
 16 57.91 161.36 9.17 28.68 57.93 161.36 9.17 28.77 
 17 57.30 500.01 5.98 33.28 57.28 500.01 5.98 33.36 
 18 64.59 769.47 9.10 52.78 64.75 769.47 9.10 52.78 
 19 74.10 1,762.54 13.03 89.86 74.38 1,762.54 13.03 90.47 
 20 67.35 1,066.82 14.10 51.72 67.40 1,066.82 14.10 52.07 
 21 63.54 2,500.00 13.10 94.21 63.56 2,500.00 13.10 94.72 
 22 54.02 300.03 13.09 25.16 53.86 300.03 13.09 25.20 
 23 53.67 179.30 18.92 22.44 53.55 179.30 18.92 22.37 
 24 47.72 210.10 5.80 21.26 47.51 210.10 14.80 21.22 
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Appendix B. Full results convergence test with MIX prices 
Table B.1 Estimation results APX as function of MIX 
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 1.02 0.01 -0.73 0.45 0.93 3.60 0.03 0.23 0.57 Rejected 
2 1.01 0.00 -0.17 0.14 0.99 2.16 0.12 0.06 0.17 OK 
3 1.00 0.00 -0.20 0.13 0.99 1.13 0.32 -0.05 -0.16 OK 
4 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.99 0.18 0.83 0.03 0.11 OK 
5 1.00 0.00 -0.13 0.11 0.99 0.66 0.52 -0.03 -0.10 OK 
6 1.00 0.00 -0.11 0.12 0.99 0.56 0.57 0.01 0.02 OK 
7 1.00 0.00 -0.02 0.09 1.00 0.32 0.73 0.03 0.07 OK 
8 0.99 0.00 0.21 0.10 1.00 9.58 0.00 -0.11 -0.20 Rejected 
9 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.14 1.00 2.95 0.05 0.03 0.04 OK 
10 1.00 0.00 0.54 0.21 0.99 8.15 0.00 0.40 0.57 Rejected 
11 1.00 0.00 0.90 0.36 0.99 6.33 0.00 0.67 0.89 Rejected 
12 1.00 0.01 1.36 0.79 0.95 3.10 0.05 1.05 1.30 Rejected 
13 1.00 0.01 0.81 0.70 0.94 2.67 0.07 0.66 0.93 OK 
14 1.00 0.01 0.87 0.63 0.95 2.75 0.06 0.66 0.96 OK 
15 1.00 0.01 0.52 0.45 0.98 1.25 0.29 0.39 0.60 OK 
16 1.00 0.01 0.43 0.42 0.98 2.34 0.10 0.52 0.86 OK 
17 1.00 0.00 0.38 0.15 1.00 3.36 0.04 0.19 0.32 Rejected 
18 1.01 0.00 -0.74 0.25 0.99 15.77 0.00 0.29 0.42 Rejected 
19 0.99 0.00 0.97 0.27 0.99 7.77 0.00 0.10 0.14 Rejected 
20 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.35 0.98 1.45 0.23 0.25 0.39 OK 
21 0.99 0.00 0.89 0.22 0.99 8.66 0.00 0.04 0.07 Rejected 
22 0.99 0.00 0.51 0.16 0.99 4.99 0.01 0.09 0.17 Rejected 
23 1.00 0.00 0.09 0.14 1.00 0.40 0.67 -0.02 -0.03 OK 
24 1.00 0.00 0.30 0.14 0.99 3.48 0.03 0.11 0.24 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%.  
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Table B.2 Estimation results EEX as function of MIX  
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 0.99 0.01 -0.22 0.36 0.95 6.23 0.00 -0.48 -1.25 Rejected 
2 1.00 0.01 -0.87 0.34 0.94 19.35 0.00 -0.85 -2.53 Rejected 
3 1.02 0.01 -1.47 0.36 0.92 22.31 0.00 -0.95 -3.15 Rejected 
4 1.01 0.01 -1.42 0.39 0.90 23.63 0.00 -1.12 -4.06 Rejected 
5 1.00 0.01 -0.53 0.38 0.90 6.83 0.00 -0.60 -2.18 Rejected 
6 1.01 0.01 -0.35 0.36 0.93 0.72 0.49 0.03 0.09 OK 
7 1.05 0.01 -2.20 0.38 0.95 18.27 0.00 -0.26 -0.69 Rejected 
8 1.03 0.01 -0.95 0.90 0.87 2.11 0.12 0.43 0.80 OK 
9 0.97 0.02 3.12 1.49 0.72 2.65 0.07 1.25 2.12 OK 
10 1.00 0.01 -0.04 0.66 0.94 0.00 1.00 -0.01 -0.02 OK 
11 0.99 0.01 0.78 0.83 0.92 0.54 0.58 0.30 0.44 OK 
12 0.96 0.02 5.33 1.99 0.68 5.83 0.00 2.70 3.71 Rejected 
13 0.96 0.02 3.73 1.11 0.84 5.85 0.00 0.88 1.33 Rejected 
14 0.99 0.01 1.33 1.01 0.86 1.06 0.35 0.48 0.76 OK 
15 0.97 0.01 1.74 0.89 0.88 2.07 0.13 0.14 0.23 OK 
16 0.99 0.01 0.16 0.40 0.97 9.57 0.00 -0.66 -1.18 Rejected 
17 0.99 0.01 -0.03 0.43 0.97 4.80 0.01 -0.54 -0.98 Rejected 
18 0.99 0.02 1.13 1.51 0.77 0.29 0.75 0.48 0.77 OK 
19 0.95 0.03 4.63 2.16 0.59 2.45 0.09 1.59 2.49 OK 
20 1.00 0.01 0.12 1.00 0.86 0.08 0.92 0.17 0.29 OK 
21 1.00 0.01 -0.28 0.41 0.97 0.41 0.66 -0.14 -0.24 OK 
22 0.99 0.01 -0.12 0.32 0.97 6.40 0.00 -0.42 -0.85 Rejected 
23 1.00 0.01 -0.26 0.31 0.97 6.69 0.00 -0.41 -0.85 Rejected 
24 0.99 0.01 -0.37 0.32 0.96 29.78 0.00 -0.91 -2.30 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
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Table B.3 Estimation results EXAA as function of MIX   
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 0.99 0.01 -0.15 0.23 0.98 12.64 0.00 -0.42 -1.11 Rejected 
2 0.98 0.01 0.09 0.22 0.97 17.57 0.00 -0.46 -1.39 Rejected 
3 0.99 0.01 -0.12 0.22 0.97 19.66 0.00 -0.55 -1.86 Rejected 
4 0.98 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.96 17.42 0.00 -0.45 -1.68 Rejected 
5 0.99 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.97 2.54 0.08 -0.16 -0.60 OK 
6 0.99 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.97 2.63 0.07 -0.18 -0.57 OK 
7 1.00 0.01 -0.27 0.23 0.98 0.68 0.51 -0.08 -0.22 OK 
8 1.00 0.00 -0.02 0.28 0.99 1.15 0.32 0.17 0.32 OK 
9 0.99 0.01 0.58 0.36 0.98 1.33 0.26 0.15 0.24 OK 
10 0.97 0.00 1.82 0.35 0.98 19.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.13 Rejected 
11 0.97 0.00 1.85 0.34 0.99 18.44 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 Rejected 
12 1.00 0.01 0.46 0.48 0.98 0.97 0.38 0.28 0.37 OK 
13 1.01 0.00 -0.11 0.37 0.98 4.69 0.01 0.40 0.59 Rejected 
14 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.30 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.02 0.03 OK 
15 0.98 0.00 0.67 0.31 0.98 6.94 0.00 -0.24 -0.40 Rejected 
16 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.28 0.99 0.90 0.41 -0.10 -0.17 OK 
17 0.99 0.00 0.68 0.30 0.98 3.17 0.04 0.02 0.03 Rejected 
18 1.03 0.01 -0.90 0.61 0.96 15.42 0.00 1.23 1.90 Rejected 
19 1.01 0.01 0.24 0.45 0.98 3.36 0.04 0.60 0.88 Rejected 
20 1.03 0.01 -1.66 0.44 0.97 14.71 0.00 0.36 0.57 Rejected 
21 1.00 0.00 0.46 0.28 0.99 2.63 0.07 0.23 0.41 OK 
22 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.99 0.43 0.65 0.04 0.09 OK 
23 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.98 0.05 0.95 0.02 0.05 OK 
24 1.00 0.01 -0.19 0.24 0.98 7.37 0.00 -0.34 -0.85 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
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Table B.4 Estimation results IPEX as function of MIX    
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 0.86 0.02 13.12 0.92 0.75 289.49 0.00 6.25 13.13 Rejected 
2 0.95 0.02 6.42 0.79 0.79 147.38 0.00 4.32 10.38 Rejected 
3 1.00 0.02 2.99 0.67 0.82 99.57 0.00 3.12 8.42 Rejected 
4 1.00 0.02 2.78 0.64 0.82 90.66 0.00 2.75 7.99 Rejected 
5 0.98 0.02 3.42 0.66 0.79 89.12 0.00 2.77 8.19 Rejected 
6 0.91 0.02 7.30 0.69 0.79 168.47 0.00 4.05 10.82 Rejected 
7 0.80 0.02 17.58 0.79 0.77 540.24 0.00 8.48 18.59 Rejected 
8 0.74 0.02 26.32 1.02 0.75 491.90 0.00 10.76 17.99 Rejected 
9 0.62 0.02 47.21 1.48 0.56 896.44 0.00 22.02 32.89 Rejected 
10 0.52 0.03 72.27 2.41 0.30 856.72 0.00 36.94 49.80 Rejected 
11 0.52 0.03 77.51 2.76 0.26 781.24 0.00 39.72 50.66 Rejected 
12 0.58 0.03 64.74 2.57 0.36 564.71 0.00 30.43 36.83 Rejected 
13 0.63 0.02 43.69 1.81 0.50 477.40 0.00 16.46 22.46 Rejected 
14 0.70 0.02 34.91 1.67 0.58 392.56 0.00 14.06 19.95 Rejected 
15 0.67 0.03 43.46 2.30 0.39 357.13 0.00 20.71 30.08 Rejected 
16 0.67 0.04 50.46 2.80 0.28 427.65 0.00 28.88 44.32 Rejected 
17 0.72 0.04 54.79 3.02 0.28 500.90 0.00 36.42 55.44 Rejected 
18 0.78 0.03 48.26 2.37 0.49 466.81 0.00 32.39 44.89 Rejected 
19 0.74 0.03 48.51 2.24 0.51 448.73 0.00 28.77 38.43 Rejected 
20 0.66 0.02 49.28 1.65 0.57 863.64 0.00 24.56 34.08 Rejected 
21 0.60 0.02 52.71 1.49 0.54 1,425.35 0.00 25.34 37.11 Rejected 
22 0.59 0.02 45.59 1.67 0.44 890.49 0.00 19.33 29.96 Rejected 
23 0.70 0.02 27.78 1.07 0.69 686.80 0.00 10.23 17.34 Rejected 
24 0.67 0.02 25.35 0.94 0.68 596.89 0.00 8.22 15.69 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
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Table B.5 Estimation results NordPool as function of MIX  
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 0.88 0.02 0.62 0.74 0.75 137.84 0.00 -3.95 -10.74 Rejected 
2 0.95 0.02 -0.49 0.56 0.84 57.42 0.00 -2.14 -6.39 Rejected 
3 0.99 0.01 -0.93 0.47 0.88 19.63 0.00 -1.12 -3.58 Rejected 
4 1.01 0.01 -0.59 0.40 0.90 3.00 0.05 -0.38 -1.27 OK 
5 1.01 0.01 -0.51 0.37 0.92 0.92 0.40 -0.09 -0.30 OK 
6 1.00 0.01 -1.15 0.43 0.90 22.05 0.00 -1.09 -3.36 Rejected 
7 0.86 0.01 2.57 0.56 0.84 130.66 0.00 -2.71 -7.39 Rejected 
8 0.89 0.01 1.67 0.62 0.84 104.95 0.00 -2.74 -6.87 Rejected 
9 0.84 0.02 2.47 0.75 0.78 191.72 0.00 -4.42 -10.18 Rejected 
10 0.76 0.02 4.61 0.83 0.73 373.52 0.00 -6.56 -14.31 Rejected 
11 0.69 0.02 6.95 0.84 0.70 524.86 0.00 -7.72 -16.39 Rejected 
12 0.67 0.02 7.04 0.83 0.70 674.14 0.00 -8.90 -18.54 Rejected 
13 0.65 0.02 7.27 0.84 0.69 747.94 0.00 -9.52 -19.81 Rejected 
14 0.66 0.02 7.08 0.83 0.69 668.35 0.00 -8.96 -19.12 Rejected 
15 0.72 0.02 5.19 0.83 0.70 466.71 0.00 -7.53 -16.75 Rejected 
16 0.74 0.02 4.69 0.81 0.71 391.98 0.00 -6.74 -15.40 Rejected 
17 0.77 0.02 3.46 0.79 0.74 374.17 0.00 -6.49 -14.87 Rejected 
18 0.77 0.02 3.63 0.83 0.73 350.67 0.00 -6.58 -14.69 Rejected 
19 0.68 0.02 6.62 0.84 0.69 571.28 0.00 -8.30 -17.86 Rejected 
20 0.64 0.02 7.46 0.88 0.65 687.76 0.00 -9.63 -20.38 Rejected 
21 0.63 0.02 7.56 0.83 0.67 742.64 0.00 -9.54 -20.53 Rejected 
22 0.74 0.02 4.03 0.80 0.72 460.32 0.00 -7.17 -16.39 Rejected 
23 0.73 0.02 4.20 0.82 0.70 445.52 0.00 -7.23 -16.77 Rejected 
24 0.81 0.02 2.56 0.78 0.71 215.11 0.00 -4.93 -12.78 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
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Table B.6 Estimation results Omel as function of MIX   
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 0.93 0.02 5.28 0.74 0.84 57.46 0.00 2.30 5.03 Rejected 
2 0.92 0.01 5.60 0.61 0.86 81.50 0.00 2.38 5.78 Rejected 
3 0.96 0.01 3.72 0.60 0.85 59.08 0.00 2.14 5.70 Rejected 
4 0.94 0.02 4.60 0.63 0.82 74.69 0.00 2.55 7.16 Rejected 
5 0.98 0.02 3.17 0.60 0.83 63.57 0.00 2.35 6.81 Rejected 
6 0.96 0.01 2.80 0.53 0.87 31.02 0.00 1.34 3.71 Rejected 
7 0.93 0.01 3.22 0.49 0.91 22.26 0.00 0.50 1.23 Rejected 
8 0.96 0.01 3.09 0.55 0.91 28.75 0.00 1.27 2.82 Rejected 
9 0.95 0.01 3.72 0.57 0.91 29.38 0.00 1.15 2.36 Rejected 
10 0.93 0.01 4.84 0.63 0.90 37.58 0.00 1.29 2.47 Rejected 
11 0.90 0.01 7.35 0.71 0.88 72.21 0.00 2.05 3.72 Rejected 
12 0.87 0.01 8.69 0.74 0.87 73.70 0.00 1.53 2.70 Rejected 
13 0.87 0.01 8.63 0.69 0.89 84.37 0.00 1.50 2.64 Rejected 
14 0.87 0.01 8.82 0.63 0.90 109.56 0.00 1.75 3.15 Rejected 
15 0.89 0.01 6.73 0.61 0.90 65.15 0.00 1.16 2.24 Rejected 
16 0.91 0.01 5.90 0.57 0.91 60.18 0.00 1.20 2.40 Rejected 
17 0.93 0.01 5.36 0.64 0.89 56.21 0.00 1.77 3.58 Rejected 
18 0.91 0.01 6.36 0.69 0.87 54.48 0.00 1.73 3.38 Rejected 
19 0.88 0.01 8.56 0.81 0.84 60.60 0.00 1.82 3.34 Rejected 
20 0.87 0.01 9.09 0.74 0.87 76.67 0.00 1.64 2.91 Rejected 
21 0.87 0.01 9.20 0.77 0.87 75.12 0.00 1.73 2.99 Rejected 
22 0.82 0.01 12.63 0.70 0.88 164.36 0.00 1.83 3.10 Rejected 
23 0.91 0.01 6.64 0.63 0.90 65.85 0.00 1.52 2.79 Rejected 
24 0.96 0.01 3.41 0.67 0.89 32.51 0.00 1.62 3.28 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
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Table B.7 Estimation results POLPX as function of MIX   
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 0.93 0.02 5.28 0.73 0.78 65.76 0.00 2.55 6.83 Rejected 
2 1.14 0.03 7.12 0.94 0.71 707.60 0.00 11.60 35.80 Rejected 
3 1.25 0.04 7.20 1.11 0.64 843.73 0.00 14.62 48.96 Rejected 
4 1.90 0.07 -2.44 2.16 0.49 665.37 0.00 23.01 80.97 Rejected 
5 2.29 0.10 -7.60 2.87 0.43 603.50 0.00 27.55 100.82 Rejected 
6 1.40 0.06 8.16 2.06 0.40 463.89 0.00 20.14 66.41 Rejected 
7 1.10 0.04 8.02 1.77 0.46 175.86 0.00 11.69 30.89 Rejected 
8 0.97 0.03 8.35 1.13 0.65 155.67 0.00 6.96 17.34 Rejected 
9 1.02 0.02 0.98 0.91 0.79 17.14 0.00 1.79 4.05 Rejected 
10 0.99 0.02 0.46 0.79 0.85 0.31 0.74 -0.08 -0.17 OK 
11 0.98 0.01 1.01 0.77 0.86 1.18 0.31 -0.07 -0.14 OK 
12 0.94 0.01 2.20 0.75 0.87 15.00 0.00 -0.91 -1.81 Rejected 
13 0.92 0.01 2.63 0.66 0.89 28.90 0.00 -1.16 -2.30 Rejected 
14 0.91 0.01 2.53 0.64 0.89 53.81 0.00 -1.82 -3.64 Rejected 
15 0.96 0.01 1.42 0.68 0.88 9.47 0.00 -0.71 -1.48 Rejected 
16 0.83 0.01 4.81 0.61 0.86 194.33 0.00 -3.06 -6.60 Rejected 
17 0.66 0.02 7.83 0.87 0.66 552.53 0.00 -8.31 -17.68 Rejected 
18 0.41 0.02 16.99 0.89 0.46 1,181.79 0.00 -12.10 -24.59 Rejected 
19 0.19 0.01 18.73 0.60 0.30 7,014.51 0.00 -22.70 -44.53 Rejected 
20 0.11 0.01 20.23 0.49 0.20 ###### 0.00 -28.93 -52.56 Rejected 
21 0.17 0.01 18.06 0.58 0.27 8,978.20 0.00 -25.55 -48.89 Rejected 
22 0.34 0.01 11.67 0.63 0.49 4,933.02 0.00 -18.26 -40.03 Rejected 
23 0.46 0.01 9.37 0.65 0.61 3,243.59 0.00 -15.08 -33.46 Rejected 
24 0.67 0.02 7.81 0.65 0.73 557.08 0.00 -5.53 -13.64 Rejected 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
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Table B.8 Estimation results PWXT as function of MIX   
  MIX Constant   Wald-test1 Difference   
  Coeff St. error Coeff St. error R2 Wald Prob Effect2 % mean Conclusion 
1 1.01 0.00 -0.31 0.16 0.99 1.96 0.14 -0.06 -0.16 OK 
2 1.00 0.00 -0.08 0.13 0.99 1.02 0.36 0.05 0.13 OK 
3 1.01 0.00 -0.12 0.15 0.99 4.43 0.01 0.14 0.45 Rejected 
4 1.00 0.00 -0.12 0.08 1.00 1.20 0.30 -0.03 -0.13 OK 
5 1.00 0.00 -0.14 0.12 0.99 5.94 0.00 -0.21 -0.86 Rejected 
6 1.00 0.00 -0.06 0.11 0.99 0.74 0.48 -0.06 -0.20 OK 
7 1.00 0.00 -0.20 0.14 0.99 3.06 0.05 -0.18 -0.46 Rejected 
8 1.00 0.00 -0.33 0.21 0.99 2.05 0.13 -0.20 -0.36 OK 
9 1.00 0.00 -0.10 0.13 1.00 1.50 0.22 -0.11 -0.18 OK 
10 1.00 0.00 -0.07 0.14 1.00 1.12 0.33 -0.11 -0.16 OK 
11 1.00 0.00 -0.02 0.14 1.00 0.46 0.63 -0.06 -0.09 OK 
12 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.17 1.00 1.93 0.15 -0.04 -0.05 OK 
13 1.00 0.00 0.15 0.12 1.00 1.39 0.25 -0.02 -0.03 OK 
14 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.12 1.00 1.52 0.22 0.03 0.05 OK 
15 1.00 0.00 0.16 0.13 1.00 0.83 0.43 0.03 0.04 OK 
16 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 1.00 1.69 0.19 -0.07 -0.11 OK 
17 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.14 1.00 0.08 0.92 -0.01 -0.01 OK 
18 1.00 0.00 -0.17 0.15 1.00 0.79 0.46 -0.11 -0.17 OK 
19 1.00 0.00 -0.05 0.11 1.00 0.67 0.51 -0.09 -0.12 OK 
20 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.08 1.00 1.28 0.28 0.05 0.08 OK 
21 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 1.00 0.03 0.97 -0.01 -0.01 OK 
22 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.16 1.00 0.77 0.46 0.08 0.15 OK 
23 1.01 0.00 -0.23 0.15 1.00 2.86 0.06 0.06 0.12 OK 
24 1.00 0.00 -0.10 0.15 0.99 1.49 0.23 0.07 0.15 OK 
1. Wald test is the test that the coefficient for PWXT = 1 and the constant =0.  
2. The effect is calculated at the sample mean and given in euro per MWh difference with the sample mean. 
Bold coefficients and test-statistics are significant at 5%. 
 
